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Timothy Besley
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Abstract
In standard approaches to the political economy of inequality, the
income distribution and the preferences of households are taken as
xed when studying how incomes are determined within and between
nations. This paper makes the income distribution endogenous by
supposing that aspirational parents can socialize children into having
aspirational preferences which are modeled as a reference point in in-
come space. The model looks at the endogenous determination of the
level of income, income inequality and income redistribution where the
proportion of aspirational individuals evolves endogenously according
to payo¤s along the equilibrium path. The paper discusses implica-
tions of the model for intergenerational mobility. It also shows how
the income generation process is critical for the dynamics and welfare
conclusions. Finally, it looks at some evidence from the World Values
Survey in light of the theory.
JEL Codes: A130, D110, D630, I310,
This paper is a revised version of the 2015 Hicks Lecture, sponsored by Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, and delivered at Oxford University on 3 November 2015.
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1 Introduction
Despite enormous increases in incomes over human history, there are groups
of individuals and societies that have been left behind. Understanding this
and what can be done about it remains a challenge and an important agenda
at the heart of economics.
The traditional take on disadvantage among economists emphasizes the
absence of physical and human capital. Economic development over the past
two centuries was underpinned by large increases in capital inputs which form
the cornerstone of modern theories of economic growth and development.
Moreover, access to key assets is essential in explaining within-country vari-
ation in incomes with the poor lacking skills and access to the land, plant
and machinery needed to make them more productive.
Such explanations of inequality within and between nations give little role
for di¤erences in preferences as a source of economic success. Indeed much of
economics has been suspicious of seeking such an approach. The concern is
that once this is allowed, then there are simply too many degrees of freedom
that can be used to explain outcomes at either the individual or societal
level. However, this contrasts with sociological accounts of development and
change such as Durkheim (1893) and Polanyi (1944) which have emphasized
the importance of changing attitudes along the development path. Whether
these are reections or causes of development and income distribution is
much more di¢ cult to judge and the approach taken here hints at how to
think about this in the context of an autonomously evolving social system
where preferences, policies and incomes co-evolve rather than being causally
related.1
This paper will focus on a specic aspect of preference dynamics and
reects an increasing appreciation among economists of the role of aspira-
tions in inuencing economic success.2 The paper explores the implications
of aspirations for the evolution of an economy with a particular focus on
determinants of income distribution within and between economies.
The approach that the paper proposes has two core elements. First,
it makes preferences endogenous and gives them a role in the transmission
mechanism of economic advantage. This recognizes that family background
1As is discussed in greater detail below, economists are also now more accepting of the
importance of studying the role of socialization as a force in the way that economies evolve
(see, for example, Bisin and Verdier, 2011).
2See, for example, Appadurai (2003) and Ray (1998, 2006).
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shapes life chances not only by a¤ecting endowments of nancial wealth and
human capital, but also via factors which determine e¤ort levels which here
are a¤ected by aspirations. Second, the approach looks at the determination
of the distribution of income in terms of endogenous earnings abilities along-
side nal incomes with endogenous redistribution of income. The paper
uses a simple political economy model to allow a feedback from preferences
to redistribution. It is the feedback from redistribution to the dynamics of
preferences which determines the direction that a society takes.
The paper provides a framework for reecting on sources of societal and
individual advantage. It demonstrates the possibility of an aspirational
poverty trap in which countries are locked into a low aspirations culture
which inhibits development. This is due to the interplay between preferences
and politics which creates a feedback loop which in turn a¤ects a societys
equilibrium trajectory.
The second is the impact that aspirations have on income distribution
within a society. Accident of birth is one of the principal sources of inequality.
But debates rage about what are the parts of such endowments at birth that
are rigid and which are amenable to policy intervention. Views about this
often go to the heart of discussions about the role of redistributive policies
and the legitimacy of distributive outcomes. Moreover, underpinning the
process that turns new born infants into fully edged citizens and workers
is a complex process involving social interactions and economic inuences.
It is now appreciated that understanding this raises issues that inevitably
combines insights from di¤erent social sciences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
there is a discussion of a range of relevant literatures which are brought to-
gether here. In section 3, the core theoretical building blocks are developed.
Their implications for income distribution between and within societies are
discussed in section 4. Section 5 considers a somewhat di¤erent underlying
economic model which casts further light on the issues. Section 6 looks at
evidence in the World Values Survey while section 8 concludes.
2 Background
This paper relates to four lines of enquiry in economics, and the social sciences
more broadly, which have developed largely independently of one another.
The review here is selective but will give the reader a sense of the range of
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ideas that the paper touches upon. This underlines the hope that this paper
will help to cross-fertilizeideas in hitherto separate areas of knowledge.
The Political Economy of Redistribution There are three aspects of
political issues which impinge on the themes of this paper. First, there
is the literature on determinants of income redistribution. Second, there
are debates around the nature of redistributive preferences and third, there
are questions about the role in society that inequality plays in motivating
individuals. These issues are now discussed briey.
There is a large formal literature on the political economy of redistribution
beginning with the work of Roberts (1977), Romer (1975) and Meltzler and
Richards (1981). In the canonical approach, the median voter chooses a
level of an income tax where the proceeds are redistributed to citizens. The
motive for redistribution in this framework comes from the fact that the
decisive voter has an income below mean income; a small rise in the income
tax sees this voter losing income depending on the median voters income
and gain in proportion to average income. This must be o¤set against any
deadweight loss due to distortions in labor supply.
Although the paper stays within this framework, it uses a citizen candi-
date approach based on Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski
(1996). In these models, a particular citizen representing a group is elected
and implements his/her preferred policy. The paper combines this with a
probabilistic voting model which is used extensively in Persson and Tabellini
(2000). This will tend to make the expected level of redistribution smoothly
increasing in the proportion of low income individuals.
Our core approach uses selsh preferences to motivate redistribution.
However, there is also a literature on the nature of redistributive prefer-
ences reviewed in Alesina and Guiliano (2011). Individuals may hold to
specic moral principles or perceptions of fairness as the basis for preferring
some kinds of redistributive policies to others. One specic hypothesis is the
prospect of upward mobility(POUM) hypothesis, i.e. the idea that those
who anticipate that they are upwardly mobile will tend to favor less redistrib-
ution. Although these two things will be correlated in our framework, there
is no direct link between aspirations and demand for redistribution. The
idea that beliefs about how the world works feed into redistributive prefer-
ences is developed in Benabou and Tirole (2006) who also demonstrate the
possibility of multiple equilibria. Fong (2001) provides evidence that there
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are links between such beliefs and preferences for redistribution.
Most approaches to the political economy of redistribution begin from a
starting point where the distribution of initial income is determined by ex-
ogenous factors (typically individual ability or capital ownership). However,
there are two important debates about inequality and redistribution which
this approach sidesteps: discussions about what creates a legitimate level of
inequality and whether there are views about the process which generates
inequality and which feed into judgements about what is just. Second, there
are issues about how far inequality plays a role in motivating people. These
issues were discussed in Friedman (1953) who says:
one cannot rule out the possibility that a large part of the
existing inequality of wealth can be regarded as produced by men
to satisfy their tastes and preferences....(And) many common eco-
nomic and social arrangements ... can be interpreted as, at least
in part, devices for achieving a distribution of wealth in confor-
mity with the tastes and preferences of the members of society.
(page 290)
The logic of Friedmans argument is explored using an occupational choice
model with risk taking in Kanbur (1979). A key issue is whether there is a
positive role for inequality in maintaining an incentive to put in e¤ort. In
a broad sense, the way that the paper models the impact of redistribution is
related to theoretical approaches to moral hazard where income redistribu-
tion acts as an insurance device, diminishing incentives for prudent behavior.
Varian (1980) develops a model of income redistribution with this feature.
Following Kuznets (1955), there is now a sizeable literature on the dynam-
ics of redistribution and growth. Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion
and Bolton (1997) emphasize the importance of credit constraint in a¤ect-
ing the paths of individual incomes and the growth process in the economy.
Benabou (1996) introduces endogenous redistribution and notes the possi-
bility for income redistribution to increase growth in such settings. St Paul
and Verdier (1993) study redistribution in the form of education which can
enhance growth.
Also relevant to the analysis developed here is the emerging empirical
literature on the impact of incentives on e¤ort which is reviewed in Prender-
gast (2013). In a key contribution, Bandiera et al (2007) estimate this in the
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context of a eld experiment and their ndings are in line with a more estab-
lished literature on static labour supply elasticities.3 More recent e¤orts have
also tried to look at life-cycle decisions such as investing in human capital as
in Blundell et al (2015). They nd e¤ects on human capital accumulation
from government tax and transfer programs using UK data.
Determinants of Economic and Social Mobility Studying the eco-
nomics of intergenerational mobility has a long tradition in economics. The
traditional focus is on the role of background in a¤ecting the level of inherited
wealth (see Jäntti and Jenkins (2015)) for a comprehensive review.4 Among
the core theoretical models of intergenerational transmission are those based
on human capital accumulation and intergenerational wealth transmission
such as Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), Loury (1981), Hassler et al (2007)
and Solon (2004). It is well known from the empirical literature that there is
a strong link between parental and child income, although interpreting this
in terms of a specic mechanism is di¢ cult as there are so many reasons why
having higher family income is a source of advantage including alleviating
credit constraints for accumulation of human capital and direct transmission
of income generating assets.
A recent literature has focused on the importance of early childhood expe-
riences in the determination of life chances (see Cunha and Heckman, 2009).
Moreover, there is now a greater emphasis on the role of non-cognitive skills
such perseverance and motivation which are strongly correlated with eco-
nomic success. Cunha and Heckman (2009) traces the roots of these ideas
back to Alfred Marshall who emphasized the importance of maternal inu-
ence in building character.
There is a large literature outside of economics on the importance of aspi-
rational parents for the success of their children. In the framework developed
here, this works via parents shaping the preferences of their children rather
than due to strategic investments by parents. However, as the paper shows
below such strategic behaviour could be incorporated into the model. From
Aristotle onwards good parenting is taken as a virtue but like most virtues is
3However, it is well-known that this is only one aspect of how taxes can a¤ect incentives
and taxable income elasticities tend to be larger than hours elasticities since they could
also reect a range of other margins, such as pursuing a promotion.
4A large sociological literature has tended to focus on social class rather than income
mobility (see, for example, Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992).
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in short supply. If being an aspirational child pays o¤, then it is reasonable
to expect that this virtuous trait will become more prevalent.
The sociological literature has studied the determinants of economic suc-
cess as a function of social background giving a central role of the family.5
In a classic sociological account, Bales and Parsons (1955) put it as follows:
If .. the essentials of human personality were determined
biologically, independent of social systems, there would be no
need for families ... It is because the human is not "born" but
must be "made" through the socialization process that in the
rst instance families are necessary. They are "factories" which
produce human personalities.... We therefore suggest that the
basic and irreducible functions of the family are two: rst the
primary socialization of children so that they can truly become
members of the society into which they have been born; second,
the stabilization of the adult personalities of the society.(pages
16-17)
This account focuses on the family as the key institution in socialization.
This in turn links to the idea of cultural capital a term coined by Pierre
Bourdieu to refer to the non-pecuniary factors that increase social mobility
such as intellect or appearance (see, for example Bourdieu, 1986 and Bour-
dieu and Passeron, 1990). Bourdieu (1986) discusses the factors that shape
transmission of such capital including the role of parents and education. The
absence of cultural capital available to some individuals is a potential con-
straint on social mobility.
A key feature of the model that is presented below is whether or not
matching among parents is assortative. There is now a large theoretical
and empirical literature on this in economics which draws out implications
for inequality (see, for example, Kremer, 1997 and Fernandez and Rogerson,
2001). This is also related to debates about how to conceive of and op-
erationalize the idea of equality of opportunity (see, Kanbur and Wagsta¤,
2014, for an overview).
As documented by Chetty et al (2014), there is substantial geographical
variation in intergenerational mobility in the United States. Subsequent
work by Chetty and Hendren (2015) has taken advantage of data on ve
5See, for example Rutter (2006) for a discussion of the nature/nurture debate.
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million families which have moved across the United States. The quasi-
experimental evidence available from this shows an e¤ect of neighbourhoods
on intergenerational mobility through childhood exposure; specically, chil-
dren whose families move to a better neighborhood as measured by the
outcomes of children already living there  have outcomes which improve
linearly in proportion to the time they spend in that area. They also exploit
county-level variation to nd that children growing up in families at the 25th
percentile of the income distribution, each year of childhood exposure to a
one standard deviation (SD) better county increases income in adulthood by
0.5%. Such neighbourhood e¤ects could reect a range of factors but sug-
gest that there could be an important role for cultural inuence on outcomes
when children are exposed to di¤erent environments.
The Behavioral Economics of Poverty The mainstream economic view
of poverty has focused on how limited access to physical and human assets
limits economic opportunities. However, the rise of behavioral economics has
widened the agenda to incorporate the possibility that frictions in decision
making can be more prevalent among the poor. Specically, certain behav-
ioral biases can be an impediment to making best use of available talents
and assets. This view is developed, for example, in Bertrand et al (2004).
An important example of a behavioral bias is self-control problems which
lead to under investment in physical or human capital. These are studied
in Banerjee and Mullanaithan (2010) and Bernheim et al (2015).
The idea that failure of aspirations is important to human achievement
forges a link between anthropological and sociological studies of poverty with
those that are typical in economics. For example Appadurai (2003) frames
the issue in terms of the capacity to aspirewhich he claims is a:
navigational capacity. The more privileged in society simply
have used the map of its norms to explore the future more fre-
quently and more realistically, and to share this knowledge with
one another more routinely than their poorer and weaker neigh-
bors. The poorer members because of their lack of opportunities
to practice the use of this navigational capacity ... have a more
brittle horizon of aspirations.page 69.
This view has been pioneered in economics by Ray (1998, 2006) who puts
aspirations at centre stage in understanding poverty. In Ray (2006), he
observes that:
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individual desires and standards of behavior are often dened
by experience and observation; they dont exist in social isolation
as consumer preferences are so often assumed to....(T)here is
much to be learned by viewing poverty both as a (partial) result
of and a (partial) cause of a failure of aspiration.page 409.
These ideas are developed further to explain the dynamics of poverty in Geni-
cot and Ray (2015) and Dalton et al (2015).The canonical approach is one
where aspiration levels a¤ect e¤ort and hence income generation. They em-
phasize the role of internalities in creating aspirational poverty traps whereas
here the focus is on externalities due to cultural inuence transmitted via
family background. Bernard et al (2011) explore these ideas in Ethiopian
data and what they call fatalismwhich they regard to be not believing in
the e¢ cacy of well-being enhancing investments.
One way to think about aspirations is as a reference point. Koszegi
and Rabin (2006) develop a canonical model of endogenous reference points
which a¤ect behavior and Hsiaw (2013) discusses how goal setting can be a
way of overcoming time consistency problems.
Cultural Evolution The ideas in this paper are inuenced by the for-
mal models of cultural evolution developed by Boyd and Richerson (1985)
and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). They model dynamic behavioral
change as social learning which propagates behavior in populations. These
approaches borrow the formal structure of population biology to develop
models of the transformation of behavior. The approach has been inuen-
tial in exploring the basis of unselsh behavior in kin groups or more extended
social groups. They consider the role of cultural parents who inuence the
behavior of their o¤spring. The idea of a cultural parent is much wider than
biological or foster parents. It can include a range of peers in education,
social life and education who shape the behavior of others.
The canonical example is of a public goods game with a standard incen-
tive to free-ride on the contributions of others so that rational self-interested
individuals do not contribute. They consider three evolutionary mecha-
nisms of change: mutations, genetic drift (which is relevant only in nite
populations) and natural selection. Boyd and Richerson (1982) formulate
an approach to "conformist transmission" where individuals imitate the more
common behavioral types among their cultural parents. This creates a force
that increases the frequency of more common types in the population.
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There is now an emerging literature in economics which develops these
ideas. Bisin and Verdier (2001) develop a model where the decision to
socialize children is strategic and depends on the payo¤s that the children
will receive weighed against the social distance that it creates between
parents and children. This approach is applied in Bisin and Verdier (2000)
to study the dynamics of religion and ethnicity. Kuran and Sandholm (2008)
also develop a model of cultural integration. A useful review of the approach
and the literature can be found in Bisin and Verdier (2011).6
The approach to the evolution of preferences used here builds on the
indirect evolutionary approach introduced in Güth and Yaari (1992) and
Güth (1995). They propose that preferences can respond to payo¤s in
repeated games. In such models, whether or not preferences are observable is
a key issue. In our setting this is not important as the only form of externality
comes through voting where individuals (stochastically) vote sincerely. The
importance of the indirect evolution approach is emphasized in the context of
collective action in Ostrom (2000). By changing preferences, societies can be
more or less cooperative and hence able to solve collective action problems.
Most of the literature and applications of these ideas to date has tended to
focus on small-scale cooperation.
The model developed here has some similar features in the way that
it uses population dynamics. In common with economic approaches, the
model gives payo¤s associated with di¤erent types at the heart of the dy-
namic process where the evolution of preference-types is made endogenous.
In common with most of the literature outside of economics, the transmis-
sion of preferences is unconscious operating through osmosis rather than via
purposiveness decision making by cultural parents. This contrasts with the
approach taken, for example, in Bisin and Verdier (2011). How much of the
social processes in practice is due to strategic or unconscious socialization is
not so clear.
3 The Model
This section lays out the basic framework and its key ingredients for exploring
how aspirations evolve in society and a¤ect the path of incomes, inequality
and redistribution. The key components are a model of e¤ort choice by young
6See also Saez-Marti and Zillibotti (2008) for an overview of the issues.
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individuals whose preferences are the production of socialization determined
by their parental background.
Framework Time is innite and indexed by t. Each generation comprises
a continuum of individuals of size one who live for two periods. There are two
points in the life-cycle; when young individuals put in e¤ort and when old,
they earn income by supplying a unit of e¤ort inelastically. All individuals
are born with earnings ability aL but can increase this to aH (> aL). E¤ort,
which is best thought of as how much to study in education, is denoted by
e 2 [0; 1] and determines the probability that an individuals earnings ability
is aH when old.
Preferences when old depend on income denoted by yJ for J 2 fL;Hg.
E¤ort is costly and this distutility is experienced when young. The main non-
standard feature of the model is the possibility that individuals benchmark
their income against a reference level, r: Specically if their income is less
than the reference level, they experience a loss   [r   yJ ], so that  indexes
loss aversion. This broad approach is consistent with the prospect theory
model of choice due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979). A second non-
standard feature is a time-inconsistent behavioral bias individuals do not
care about their future income when they are young. All of these features
can be captured in the following lifetime preferences:
U (; ; r; yH ; yL; e) =  [eyH + (1  e) yL]   (1  e) [r   yL]  c (e)
by assuming that  = 1 when agents are old while  = 0 when they are young.
Two possible reference points are considered, denoted by r 2 fyL; yHg. In
the case of r = yL an individual experiences no loss when she achieves yL
while, if r = yH , she experiences a loss when income is yL because this falls
short of her reference level. Throughout, the paper refers to agents with
r = yH as aspirational7 t denoting the fraction of the population which is
aspirational at date t. The cost of e¤ort c (e) is increasing and convex with
c (0) = c0 (0) = 0 and c0 (1) >  [aH   aL].
This formulation of decision-making captures an intra-agent agency prob-
lem where the preferences of the old and young conict since only adults
7Throughout we will focus on the case where the aspirational level of income is taken
as post-tax income. If instead the reference point were based on pre-tax incomes, then
e¤ort level would be decoupled from the tax rate. However, the main core features of the
analysis would remain.
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care directly about earnings. Aspirational preferences are then a device
for overcoming the shortsightedness of children and encouraging them to be
motivated towards putting in e¤ort. This formulation is deliberately quite
extreme but the general thrust of the argument will be preserved so long
as  < 1 when children choose e¤ort and r > yL. In general, fostering
aspirations could lead to under- or over-correction of present-bias.
Income may di¤er from labour earnings due to a government tax and
transfer program. Suppose that the government redistributes income using
a standard income tax and transfer scheme where  is the income tax rate
and T is the transfer per agent. Then
yJ = (1  ) aJ + T for J 2 fL;Hg :
Let  denote the fraction of high income individuals so that the government
budget constraint implies that
T =  [aH + (1  ) aL] :
The tax rate is bounded so that  2 [L; H ] where these bounds capture
a minimal socially acceptable level of redistribution, L, and a rate above
which high income taxes are evaded, H .8
Politics Politics is modeled as a citizen-candidate game with probabilistic
voting where both adult groups, i.e. high and low income individuals, put
up a candidate. High income candidates will prefer L whereas low income
candidates prefer H . Voters then decide which candidate to support with
the winner determined by majority rule. As in standard probabilistic vot-
ing models, voters are also inuenced by non-policy relevant characteristics.9
The popularity shocks to voting make non-majoritarian policy outcomes pos-
sible.
Specically, let " 2 [ 1; 1] be the shock to voting for a high income
candidate which is assumed to have a uniform distribution and to be iid over
time with a fresh draw in each period. Given the range of ", no election
is ever completely safe if 0 <  < 1. A high income candidate wins if she
8The latter could be derived endogenously by specifying an enforcement technology
and/or endogenous labor supply.
9This set-up could also be motivated by having another policy dimension which also
inuences voting behavior.
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secures at least half the votes, i.e.
+ "  (1  ) :
Thus, the ex ante probability that a high income candidate wins is
Prob ("  1  2) = ;
which is simply the population share of high income individuals. The ex-
pected tax rate is therefore L + (1  ) H .
Reproduction and Socialization Children have two parents and, to keep
the population balanced, every pair of parents (a family in this setting) has
two children. The matching process for parents is not modelled explicitly; the
paper assumes that a fraction  of mating is assortative, i.e. has individuals
parenting children with someone of their own type. The remaining 1  
 match randomly. As will be seen precisely below, the fraction of the
population which matches assortatively does not a¤ect the steady state of
the model only the speed of convergence as long as  < 1, i.e. there is some
random matching. The parameter  can be thought of as a crude measure
of the openness of social structures in a society since assortative will tend
to entrench the existing structure of preference while lower  leads to more
rapid culture change.
Children are socialized by their parents. For simplicity, suppose that hav-
ing two parents of the same type guarantees that these preferences are passed
along to their children.10 However, if an individual has mixed parenting, then
whether an individual becomes aspirational depends on the expected utility
of being an aspirational type relative to a non-aspirational type. Specically
let  () be the utility di¤erence between aspirational and non-aspirational
when the proportion of aspirational individuals in the population is  and let
K 2 ( 1;1) for K 2 fA;Ng be an idiosyncratic shock then an individual
with mixed parentage becomes aspirational if and only if  + A  N .
Suppose that A and N each have a type one extreme value distribution
as in the standard logit model.11 Then the probability that an individual
10This is clearly a strong assumption, adopted here to make the analysis sharper and
simpler. One could consider alternatives, such as a xed mutationrate in homogenous
groups.
11Specically, we will suppose that
Pr ob (K  x) = exp [  exp [   x]]
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with mixed parents is the aspirational type when the utility di¤erence is
 () is
 ( ()) =
exp [ ()]
1 + exp [ ()]
:
Given that there is a continuum of types, this will also be the proportion of
those with mixed parentage who are aspirational. Note that  () is smoothly
increasing with  (0) = 1=2.
Using this, write the proportion of the population who are aspirational
at time t+ 1 given that t are aspirational at t as:
t+1 = t + (1  )

2t + 2t (1  t)  ( (t))

:
To interpret this, note that assortative matching preserves the proportion of
aspirational individuals. However, among those who are randomly matched,
a fraction 2t are matched with other aspirational individuals. The fraction
of mixed parent households is therefore 2t (1  t).
A key feature of the approach is that the evolution of preferences is
grounded in the payo¤s that the di¤erent types receive bearing in mind
that this is dependent on the level of redistribution that a society chooses.
The proposed link between  (t) and the evolution of preferences is the
key positive selection e¤ect which drives the dynamics of aspirations in
the model. Random matching encourages mobility in preferences since it
a¤ects the prevalence of parents of di¤erent types who are inuenced by
 (t). However, whether random matching encourages high aspirations in
the population depends on the payo¤s that the aspirational types receive
compared to non-aspirational types. This contrasts, for example, with a
model where pure numerical supremacy of one type drives the evolutionary
process although this could be added as a feature. It is also consistent with
some aspects of a model of strategic socialization along the lines of Bisin and
Verdier (2001) where K above represents the cost/benet of socializing your
child. A key simplifying feature here is that homogeneous parents do not
socialize their children to be of di¤erent types to themselves (even if there
were large expected utility gains from doing so) which can slow the pace of
cultural evolution.12
for K 2 fA;Ng and  is Eulers constant. The specic functional form is only illustrative
and the core ideas would go through for any symmetric distribution of preferences centred
around 0.
12Of course, this could be added as a feature to the model. The friction would then
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Timing The model timing is as follows:
1. There is an initial fraction of aspirational young, t:
2. The young at time t choose their e¤ort levels e with  = 0:
3. The young become adults and their earnings ability faH ; aLg is realized
with  = 1.
4. Adults vote over redistribution which determines  2 [L; H ] and pay-
o¤s are realized.
5. The adult population matches, reproduces and socializes their children
determining t+1.
The paper looks for an equilibrium in the model where agents have ra-
tional expectations and optimize at every stage, subject to the young setting
 = 0 when they choose their e¤ort. The model is solved backwards.
Voting over Redistribution With probability  the tax rate is L in
which case transfers are
TL = L [aH + (1  ) aL]
and with probability 1  , it is
TH = H [aH + (1  ) aL] .
Thus, there are di¤erent levels of redistribution depending on which group
wins power.
E¤ort Levels Since they do not care about their future income, non-
aspirational children set e = 0 since  = 0 and e¤ort is costly. Equilibrium
e¤ort will be determined in a rational expectations equilibrium where indi-
viduals correctly anticipate that there will be a fraction  of high income
individuals in the population. Thus:
e () = arg max f  (1  e) (1  L   (1  ) H) [aH   aL]  c (e)g :
depend on how much parents do not wish to create social distancebetween them and
their children if, for example, aspirational children are inclined to look upon their parents
negatively if they are of a di¤erent type.
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At an interior solution, optimal e¤ort therefore solves the rst order condi-
tion:
(1  L   (1  ) H) [aH   aL] = c0 (e ()) :
Optimal e¤ort is decreasing in expected taxes and increasing in [aH   aL].
Thus, higher inequality encourages higher e¤ort. Note that, since the level of
expected redistribution depends on , the individually optimal level of e¤ort
depends on the anticipated average societal e¤ort level.
In solving for the rational expectations equilibrium, note that  depends
upon the proportion of aspirational individuals as follows:
 () = e ( ()):
The analysis focuses throughout on the case where:
@e ( ())
@
 < 1:
This implies that there is a unique xed point where  () is increasing in 
having a larger fraction of aspirational individuals increases the fraction of
high income individuals in the population and reduces the expected level of
redistribution.13
Using this, let  () be the expected level of income taxation as a function
of the state variable  which is given by:
 () = e ( ()) L + [1  e ( ())] H . (1)
All else equal, this is increasing in H and decreasing in H   L. Equation
(1) also conrms that having a larger group of aspirational individuals in the
population lowers the expected level of redistribution.
The Value of Aspiration The paper has now assembled the ingredients
needed to look at how the expected utility of being an aspirational individual
varies with the fraction of other aspirational individuals in the population.
This governs the socialization process along the equilibrium path. Assume
that parentssocialization decisions depend on the expected utility of each
type using adult preferences, i.e.  = 1. This can be thought of as choosing
between two "ideal types", an aspirational type and a non-aspirational type.
13This condition is always satised in the case where the cost of e¤ort is quadratic and
there is an interior solution for e¤ort.
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It is useful to dene the net gain from being aspirational (net of tax) as:
Z () = (1   ()) [aH   aL]
which is increasing in . Using this, the equilibrium e¤ort level as a function
of  can now be written as e^ (Z ()) = c0 1 (Z ()) which is a (weakly)
increasing function.
The expected utility of a non-aspirational type when a fraction  of the
population is aspirational is given by:
VN () = aL + e^ (Z ()) [aH   aL   Z ()] :
While for the aspirational type, expected utility is:
VA () = VN () +  () :
where
 () = e^ (Z ())Z ()  c (e^ (Z ()))   (1  e^ (Z ()))Z () (2)
is the utility di¤erence and contains two terms. The rst term in (2) is
positive and is the expected income gain from e¤ort given the expected level
of redistribution net of the e¤ort cost. The second term in (2), which is
negative, is the expected utility cost if aspirations are not met. The ex-
pression is negative since aspirational individuals face a utility loss if their
aspirations are not met and the probability that this loss occurs depends on
the equilibrium e¤ort level, e^ (Z ()).
Given the importance of  () in the socialization process it is necessary
to study how (2) behaves in order to understand how socialization a¤ects
the evolution of aspirational preferences as well as how policy evolves. The
explicit micro-foundation developed here can be used to investigate how dif-
ferent features of the model a¤ect  (). This is developed in the section
that follows.
4 Implications
This section explores some implications of the model, starting by studying
the dynamic paths that can be taken where aspirational preferences evolve
according to the model. It then looks at the implications for economic
mobility. The step after that is to look at how inequality and redistribution
change along the path described by the model. Finally, the section considers
some welfare implications and how policy a¤ects the path of aspirations.
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4.1 The Dynamics of Aspiration
The models dynamics can be studied by looking at how t evolves over time.
The dynamics of aspiration is governed by the following equation:
t+1   t = (1  )t (1  t) [2 ( (t))  1] ;
which makes clear how the sign of  (t) plays a key role in determining
whether the proportion of aspirational individuals increases over time. Next
dene the e¤ort levels associated with the highest and lowest levels of redis-
tributive taxation:
c0 (e) = (1  H) [aH   aL]
and
c0 (e) = (1  L) [aH   aL] :
We now have:
Proposition 1 If e < 
1+
and e and  are close enough to one, then there
exists ^ 2 (0; 1) such that for 0  ^, over time there are increasing aspira-
tions and declining redistribution with limt!1t = 1. For 0 < ^ aspirations
are decreasing over time with limt!1t = 0.
Proof. Note rst that
0 () = Z 0 () [e^ (Z ()) (1 + )  + e^0 (Z ())Z ()]
using the rst-order condition for e¤ort. This implies that 0 () > 0
whenever  () > 0 since  () > 0 implies that [e^ (Z ()) (1 + )  ] >
c (e^ (Z ())) =Z () and e^0 (Z ())Z () > 0. Thus if there exists ^ such
that  (^) = 0, then  () > 0 for all   ^. Now note that
 (0) = [e (1 + )  ] (1  H) [aH   aL]  c (e) < 0
if e < = (1 + ). Now consider
 (1) = [e^ (Z (1)) (1 + )  ]Z (1)  c (e^ (Z (1)))
As ! 1 then e^ (Z (1))! 1 as e! 1. Then this becomes:
 (1) = (1  L) [aH   aL]  c (1) = max fe (1  L) [aH   aL]  c (e)g > 0.
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By the intermediate value theorem, there exists  (^) = 0 for  2 (0; 1).
The dynamic path displays a classic tipping pointgiven by ^ and illus-
trated in Figure 114 so that the economy described by the model gives rise
naturally to multiple steady states due to the fact that whenever there is a
positive gain to being an aspirational type, then there is a positive comple-
mentarity between the fraction of such types and the expected utility gain
from being aspirational. More specically, the proof shows that 0 () > 0
whenever  () > 0, a result which is driven by the political externality
which lowers expected redistribution along this part of the dynamic path.
As with any tipping point, there is history dependence; which equilibrium
the society converges to depends on the starting point. Specically, a soci-
ety which has few aspirational types will tend to converge towards having no
aspirational types while a society that starts with many aspirational types
will tend to acquire a larger fraction. Majoritarian politics reinforces the
interests of the more numerous type in the population.
[Figure 1 about here]
The existence of multiple steady states requires that (1) > 0. However,
this need not be the case especially if e is far away from one and  is large. In
this case, the cost of failure from being aspirational can o¤set any prospective
income gains and will prevent a society becoming aspirational. This explains
why these two conditions are needed. The rst condition in Proposition 1
is needed to ensure that  (0) < 0. This will be the case when e¤ort is
low enough when the prospect of redistributive taxation is high. When
 () < 0, there need no longer be a complementarity between there being a
large fraction of aspirational types and the gain/loss from being aspirational.
A Quadratic Example To illustrate this result more concretely, sup-
pose that c (e) = e2=2 and  = 1. Then e = Z () which has an interior
solution if (1  L) [aH   aL] < 1. In this case:
 () =

(1  H) [aH   aL]
1 +  (L   H) [aH   aL]



(1  H) [aH   aL]
1 +  (L   H) [aH   aL]  
2
3

:
14The specic shape of the curve shown in this gure is purely illustrative.
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Then for the equilibrium described above we require that:
(1  H) [aH   aL] < 2=3 <

1  H + 2L
3

[aH   aL] :
Moreover
^ =
3
2
(1  H) [aH   aL]  1
(L   H) [aH   aL]
is the critical value of .15 It is straightforward to check that, in this case, ^
is increasing in [aH   aL] so that more underlying inequality implies that a
society with a larger fraction of aspirational individuals is needed to generate
a path where aspirations are growing over time.
While the logic of the multiple steady states in Proposition 1 and the
quadratic example is quite specic to the specic modelling features used
in this paper, the key mechanism that makes this possible is quite general,
namely a complementarity driven by a political externality where having
more of your type in the population means that your policy preferences are
more likely to prevail. Indeed, this logic seems quite general and robust
when political economy considerations and cultural dynamics are combined.
Moreover, it is well known that complementarities lie at the heart of dynamic
models with history dependence and multiple steady states.16
4.2 Growth, Inequality and Redistribution
The model can be used to explore the time path of incomes and inequality.
As emphasized throughout, the only source of dynamics in the model is the
evolution of aspirational preferences. All standard economic dynamics such
as capital accumulation (physical and human) and technology are left out so
as to focus on the novel features of the model.
15This lies between zero and one as long as
(1  (1  L) [aH   aL]) > (1  H) [aH   aL]
2
>
1
3
:
16See Krugman (1991) for some relevant background discussion.
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Growth in this framework is possible if the fraction of aspirational indi-
viduals, t, who put in e¤ort increases. Income per capita in the economy
is
[te^ (Z (t)) [aH   aL] + aL] ;
which is increasing in t.
17 In cases where aspirations decline over time, this
is accompanied by a decline in incomes which contrasts with income growth
in increasingly aspirational societies.
The evolution of inequality is less clear-cut even in this simple model.
The variance of the personal distribution of income is
 (t) [1   (t)] [Z (t)]2 (3)
which depends upon Z (t) which, as was noted above, is increasing in t:
The reason why Z (t) is important is that it a¤ects the gain to having high
income via the level of redistribution. It also a¤ects the e¤ort put in by
aspirational individuals which, in turn, has an e¤ect on  (t), the fraction
of high income individuals in the economy.
The quadratic form in (3) suggests that this measure of inequality might
follow an inverted Ushaped path over time with inequality rst rising and
then falling: When  (t) is small, then increasing the proportion of aspira-
tional individuals increases inequality. However, when there are su¢ ciently
many aspirational individuals in an economy and  (t) > 1=2, then inequal-
ity will tend to decline.
We summarize this discussion as:
Proposition 2 Increasing the fraction of aspirational individuals raises in-
come per capita but has an ambiguous e¤ect of the level of inequality.
We now turn to the e¤ect of changing aspirations in the economy on the
poor, i.e. those with pre-tax incomes aL. The poverty rate decreases as t
increases. To see this, note that the fraction of those with pre-tax income
aL, the headcount poverty measure, is 1 te^ (Z (t)) which is decreasing in
t.
17It would be straightforward to extend the model so that the young sacrice period one
earnings to invest in their future earnings so that their utility when young is aL [1  c (e)]
where c (e) 2 [0; 1]. In that case, there would be a loss of income from e¤ort o¤set by
higher earnings when old. Hence income would still be increasing in  under reasonable
assumptions.
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The average income of the poor may rise or fall as t increases. To see
this, observe that the expected post-tax income of the poor is given by:
aL+ (t)te^ (Z (t)) [aH   aL] = aL+[ (t) [L   H ] + H ][aH   aL] (t)
(4)
which depends on the average level of redistribution  (t) ; which is decreas-
ing in t; and the average income in society which is increasing in t. The
realized income of the poor at any date will uctuate according to the al-
location of political power between the representatives of the high and low
income groups.
It is perfectly possible for the expected level of redistribution towards the
poor to fall as t grows since the political power of low income individuals
decreases. Specically, we have:
Proposition 3 Let e
 


= , then if  > 1
2
h
H
H L
i
, then there is a range
of  2 [~; 1], such that the income of the poor is decreasing in .
Proof. Note that  is the fraction of high income individuals as  ! 1.
Now di¤erentiate (4) to obtain:
0 (t) [2 (t) [L   H ] + H ] :
Now take the limit of this expression as ! 1. This will be negative as long
as  > 1
2
h
H
H L
i
as claimed in the statement of the Proposition. Hence, if
this condition holds, there exists a value of ~ < 1 such that post-tax income
of low income individuals is decreasing in  when  is above ~ as claimed.
Whether the income of the poor decreases with higher  depends on
whether the rate at which redistribution falls is faster than the direct e¤ect
on average income which represents the size of the tax base. The condition
stated in the Proposition guarantees that there is a range of  above which
the expected post-tax income of the poor is decreasing in .
To illustrate this result, look again at the quadratic example above with
 = 1. In this case, the expected income of the poor is given by
aL+[aH   aL]

 (1  H) [aH   aL]
1 +  (L   H) [aH   aL]
 
 (1  H) [aH   aL]
1 +  (L   H) [aH   aL] [L   H ] + H

:
And
 =
(1  H) [aH   aL]
1 + (L   H) [aH   aL]
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This gives an explicit expression for ~ as:
~ =
H
(H   L) [aH   aL] (2  H) :
The result in Proposition 3 holds as long as ~ < 1.
4.3 Intergenerational Mobility
Rather than focusing exclusively on static inequality, the framework can
say something about the process driving mobility across generations and
the link between an individuals social background and subsequent economic
success. This is often a concern to policy-makers over and above how rewards
are distributed at a point in time. The current model has a particular
take on this process as it focuses on how preferences are socialized as the
source of economic attainment. This focus contrasts with the bulk of the
literature in economics which focuses on the inter-generational transfer of
assets. Obviously, a more complete picture would look at the full range
of inuences on mobility. There are three kinds of families in the model
depending on whether one, both or neither parent is the aspirational type.
A child with two non-aspirational parents is predicted by the model to
have poor life chances as such children will themselves be non-aspirational.
They may gain from society becoming more aspirational through transfers.
However, they form a type of underclassin the model with little prospect of
bettering their situation by virtue of their parental inheritance. To improve
the life chances of those who are born to two non-aspirational parents requires
some kind of direct intervention which allows them to escape from parental
inuence. It is for this group that early childhood interventions which a¤ect
non-cognitive skills are potentially most important. But conventional trans-
fer policies for such families will have no e¤ect on their economic prospects
in the model.
Non-aspirational adults who match with an aspirational adult will have
a high income child with probability  ( (t)) e^ (Z (t)) which is positive
but less than one. Societies which are on an upward aspirational path will
see the life chances of such children improving as the returns to being aspira-
tional increase. This is because as shown in Proposition 1, the socialization
term,  ( (t)), is increasing in  whenever  () is positive. This follows
Milton Friedmans logic quoted above where inequality serves as an incentive
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mechanism to encourage societal aspiration. Here, however, this a¤ects the
evolution of preferences as well as a¤ecting e¤orts and income.
Children who are born into a background where both parents are aspi-
rational have an even larger chance of having a high income and will do so
with probability e^ (Z (t)) which is strictly higher than for a child from a
mixed parentagebackground. This probability is still less than one, so
success is not guaranteed. The life chances of such children are also increased
by having more aspirational individuals around but principally through the
political externality which reduces expected redistribution and enhances the
return to putting in e¤ort.
The model focuses on the underlying social structure of families and the
motivations of parents rather than income as the determinant of intergenera-
tional mobility. However, the model predicts a correlation between income
and child attainment which is not causal. To see this, let S = fI; Jg where
I; J 2 fA;Ng be an individuals social background and let Y (S) be the
average income of an individual from a social background S. Then
Y (fN;Ng) = 2aL
Y (fN;Ag) = 2aL + e^
 
Z
 
t 1

[aH   aL]
Y (fA;Ag) = 2 aL + e^  Z  t 1 [aH   aL] :
It is straightforward to see that Y (fA;Ag) > Y (fA;Ng) > Y (fN;Ng).
The gain in expected income from having an additional aspirational parent
is

 = e^
 
Z
 
t 1

[aH   aL]
which is increasing in . So having more aspirational individuals tends to
increase the return to coming from a bettersocial background, i.e. one with
more aspirational parentage. Hence more aspirational societies, those with
higher t, will also be those in which those who have aspirational backgrounds
do better on average. This is a further complementarity predicted by the
model.
Since aspirational individuals earn more on average, the model predicts
a correlation between parental income and childrens attainment. However,
this is not a causal link since it is generated by omitted parental characteris-
tics as embodied in S. This is practically important since, if it is preferences
inherited from parents that are holding their children back, then redistrib-
uting income to low income households in this framework will not increase
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the life chances of these children. Indeed, since it lowers Z (t), greater
redistribution actually inhibits social mobility in this framework.
It would of, course, be straightforward to add a direct causal link from
parental inuence to income along the lines of Loury (1981), Solon (2004) and
Hassler et al (2007) who focus on the role of parental investments in a¤ecting
intergenerational mobility. Even without adding such investments explicitly,
one could make parental income an input into the e¤ort technology. This
could represent access to credit markets and/or better schooling through ac-
cess to private schools or living in a nicer area with better schools. However,
to the extent that socializing aspirational preference through parental back-
ground is at work as a source of immobility, the e¤ect of targeted income
based interventions to o¤set these sources of advantage would only deal with
one specic source of immobility.
The framework can be used to consider policies which encourage aspira-
tions e.g. by teaching non-cognitive and motivational skills in schools. This
opens up the wider idea that one might be able to raise the aspirations of
children by exposing them to a wider range of cultural parents beyond
their biological parents. While a full development lies beyond the scope of
this paper, this could be modeled by considering a mean shift in the random
utilityshock in the socialization model which favors aspirations so that this
becomes  ( +  ()) where the value of  > 0 is inuenced by policies tar-
geted towards increasing aspirations. The e¤ect of this policy is predicted
to be heterogeneous, a¤ecting only those with social background fA;Ng.
Given entrenched intergenerational disadvantage, there is interest in the
role of policies which target children who are from disadvantaged back-
grounds and trying to improve their non-cognitive skills. Increasing their
aspirations is a concrete example of this. The possibility of such policies can
be incorporated into the framework as follows. Suppose that it is possible to
invest so that a fraction, , of children from an fN;Ng background become
aspirational at any date t. The dynamics of aspiration will now be governed
by the following equation:
t+1   t = (1  )t (1  t) [2 ( (t))  1] + (1  t) [1  t]  (5)
which depends directly on . To study the aggregate implications of this,
notice that the high aspirational steady state where  = 1 remains a possi-
bility. More interesting is what happens to the low aspirations steady state.
Here we have the following:
25
Proposition 4 Suppose that a mobility intervention is implemented which
is e¤ective with probability  and dene
 () =

 + (1  ) (1  2^ ( ( ()))) :
Then if  ( ())  0, the low aspirations trap is eliminated.
Proof. To see this, solve for the steady state in (5) where
0 = (1  ) [2 ( ())  1] + [1  ] 
which is the low steady state in the model. We know that t+1   t > 0
whenever (t) > 0. Hence there will only be a high aspirations equilibrium
if  ( ())  0 as claimed.
This analysis underlines that, in addition to the static income gains of
those who benet from this kind of intervention, a society with such inter-
ventions is also likely to have dynamic benets and in an extreme case is less
likely to be caught in a low aspirations trap than one without. Moreover
for high enough , the low aspirations equilibrium is eliminated completely.
Even where the aspirations trap is not averted, having such a policy gives a
positive lower bound to  as given by  () in Proposition 4. This nding is
interesting in the context of policies which have been targeted at early child-
hood interventions for disadvantaged children. The focus has mainly been
on their income gains. However, the analysis opens the possibility of wider
gains operate through cultural externalities of the kind identied here.
It would be interesting in future work to consider how direct interventions
which a¤ect aspirations are part of a political equilibrium. Such policies need
to be funded out of tax revenues and hence will reduce resources available for
other redistributive programs. It is di¢ cult therefore to motivate this based
exclusively on the self-interest of adults in this model. One possibility would
be to allow citizens to care about mobility as an independent goal of societies
which would create a desire to implement such policies. It might also be
natural to think of this in terms of the forward-looking political interests of
parents at stage 1 of the model and how they care about their childrens
incomes and/or well-being.
4.4 Welfare
The framework can be used to consider whether in any sense aspirational
societies have higher welfare. We have already seen that, in the core model,
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national income will be higher. However, a proper analysis requires looking
at the welfare of all groups and how it changes with . The model is now
extended to consider what happens if welfare is based on the expected utility
of each group given .
A priori, there is no reason to believe that the evolution of aspirational
preferences will converge to a welfare maximizing outcome. The evolution of
preferences depends on  () which is only one component of utility. Hence,
it is perfectly possible for there to be a divergence between reasonable mea-
sures of welfare and the outcome to which the economy converges.
Before undertaking the analysis, it is important to acknowledge that there
are some judgements to be made about the appropriate welfare criterion. For
example, should welfare depend on the personal distribution of income ac-
cruing to adults or should it also reect the disutility of e¤ort c (e)? It is also
debatable how to take into account the loss of those aspirational individuals
who have strived for success but failed, i.e. those whose aspirations have
not been fullled. Both of these might reasonably be part of well-being but
which would not be captured in income-based measures.
As a rst pass, the analysis is based only on incomes as our benchmark;
we will look at a more conventional utility criterion subsequently. This has
the practical advantage of being based on directly measurable features. Even
so, incomes in the model also depend upon endogenously determined levels
of redistribution. The measure used, therefore, is expected post-tax income
for each group. For low income individuals this is
uL () = aL +  ()  () [aH   aL]
and for high income individuals it is:
uH () = aH   [1   ()]  () [aH   aL] :
Following Atkinson (1970), we will aggregate expected incomes using the
welfare criterion:
W ( : ) =
[1   ()] uL ()1  +  () uH ()1 
1   for   0:
With  = 0, this is just expected income [1   ()] aL+ () aH . As  !1,
this is a maximin criterion which depends only on uL ().
The rst step is to study long-run payo¤s and compare a society which
has completed its dynamic path towards either of the steady states:  = 1
or  = 0. The following result follows immediately:
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Proposition 5 For all  then W (1 : ) > W (0 : ).
This says that welfare is higher in aspirational societies according to the
criterion that we are using regardless of the preference for equality. To
see this, observe that uL (1) > uL (0) since there is a still redistribution as
 goes to one and there is nothing to redistribute when  = 0. Moreover
uH (1) > uH (0) since the expected level of redistribution is lower when  = 1.
Finally observe that uH (1) > uL (1).
As has already been established,  () drives the evolution of citizens
preferences and for  < ^ a society converges to  = 0. Thus the model has
the possibility of a poverty trap where, since the starting value for aspirations
is low, leads to a welfare inferior outcome.
The endogeneity of policy through political choice inuences the level of
redistribution, incentives for e¤ort and the nature of socialization. It is in-
teresting to ask whether a poverty trap where  converges to zero constitutes
a political failure in the sense of Besley and Coate (1998) who argue that
a political failure arises when there is a feasible policy sequence which can
make everyone better o¤ but which is not chosen in political equilibrium. In
many interesting cases, this is driven by the failure of the political system to
commit to future policy. In this model, this can arise due to a failure to com-
mit to the kind of low level of redistribution which could incentivize citizens.
To explore this formally, consider the possibility that there is lower level of
redistribution than that which emerges along the equilibrium path in politi-
cal equilibrium which would shift the society away from the low aspirations
steady state. Specically, consider restricting the level of redistribution such
that H = ~ and let
~Z = (1  ~) [aH   aL]
be the expected income gain under this constrained level of redistribution.
This restriction will lead to great e¤ort being made and also to a greater
advantage to being an aspirational type.
Now we have:
Proposition 6 If there exists ~Z such that
e^

 ~Z

  c

e^

 ~Z

  

1  e^

 ~Z

~Z > 0 >  (0)
then the low aspirations trap is a political failure, i.e. there exists a level
of redistribution which, if committed to, would generate a Pareto superior
outcome in the long-run.
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Proof. For the low aspirations trap to be a political failure that we require
that at ~Z, then  (0) > 0 whereas at L;  (0) < 0 which is the condition
stated above.
This result holds since, with redistribution at ~ , there is a gain to being
the aspirational type even when  = 0. Limiting redistribution is always
Pareto improving for a society which is in the low aspirations trap. Thus,
the political process in this case is indeed a constraint on the development
path of the economy and keeps a society in a low aspirations equilibrium.
Note however, that this does not imply that politics is the only possible
constraint. If there are high e¤ort costs and/or limited economic opportu-
nities, i.e. if aH is close to aL, then there is less incentive to put in e¤ort.
A fundamental economic reform could increase  () and could potentially
eliminate a low aspirations trap.
Even though it is better to be a low aspirations individual when  = 1
than with  = 0, this need not imply that  = 1 is the optimal outcome for
a society. A society with  = 1 may not treat its poor well if the political
power that high income individuals enjoyed leads them to redistribute less
to the poor. As the welfare function favors low income individuals when
 > 0, then we might expect that societies actually have higher welfare when
 < 1. Here we have the following result:
Proposition 7 For large enough  (> 0) then if  > 1
2
h
H
H L
i
exists ~ < 1,
such that W (~ : ) > W (1; ) :
Proof. We have already seen from Proposition 3 that when the conditions
stated in this Proposition hold there is a value ~ above which the post-tax
income of low income individuals is decreasing in : As  gets large, then the
welfare function depends on uL and hence overall welfare is decreasing in 
for   ~.
For large enough  given the conditions stated, there is a trade-o¤ be-
tween changes which raise national income and those which raise welfare, at
least when the welfare function puts su¢ cient weight on the incomes of the
poor. However, it is less clear what interventions can be chosen to make the
situation better which would require a means of reducing the gain to being
an aspirational type.
Finally, it is worth considering how basing welfare on utility rather than
the expected income could a¤ect the welfare conclusions. To see this, suppose
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instead that we use:
(1  )VN ()1  +  [VN () +  ()]1 
1   :
In this case, the conclusion in Proposition 5 that  = 1 dominates  = 0
still holds. Thus, the idea of an aspirations trap in this framework, where
welfare is lower, is quite robust. The conclusion that something short of
 = 1 is optimal could also hold in this case as  !1.
One further interesting welfare issue follows from the possibility, that
when making their socialization decisions, parents ignore the possibility that
their children will be unsuccessful and hence su¤er a loss of utility. Thus,
suppose that parents set  = 0 in their assessment of equilibrium path util-
ity which inuences their socialization but that the social welfare criterion
includes such losses. In this case the social optimum would view the true
welfare of individuals di¤erently to their parents and this could tend to favor
a society with fewer aspirational individuals. Indeed, it could even be the
case that a low aspirations society has higher welfare than a low aspirations
society with this possibility.
5 Aspirations and the Rat Race
Having more aspirational individuals in the population increases the income
of everyone either directly or through redistribution. However, this ignores
the possibility that an economy could have more of a tournament-like struc-
ture in the way that rewards are allocated and where the e¤orts of other
members of the society reduce the probability that an individual becomes a
high income individual. Thus putting in e¤ort is in part a rat racewhere
a few winners take all the rewards. We will now extend the model to in-
corporate this possibility and to explore its implications for the conclusions
reached so far. There is now an additional externality in the model so it
simplies things to focus on the case where redistribution is given exoge-
nously at  and dene Z = (1  ) [aH   aL]. This eliminates the political
externality which has been the main driving force linking e¤ort decisions so
far and allows us to focus on the implications of our di¤erent model of the
economy.
To capture the idea of a rat race formally, suppose that there is an upper
bound on the fraction of high income jobs set at  < 1. If the proportion
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of individuals who achieve exceeds the number of slots available, i.e. e > 
then they are allocated a high income job with probability =e = . To
simplify matters further, the analysis will focus on the case of a quadratic
cost of e¤ort (1=2) e2. Then the optimal e¤ort level is e = min f; 1g Z
which yields an equilibrium e¤ort level for society as a whole of
e () =
(
 Z if   = Zq


 Z otherwise.
The case where  > = Z is where the rat race kicks in since e¤ort per
capita is lower if the fraction of aspirational individuals increases, i.e. there
is now a negative externality from having more aspirational individuals in
the population. In spite of this, however, total e¤ort, e (), is increasing
in  in a rat race even though more aspiration does not lead to there being
more high income individuals in the population. Thus, if  > = Z, the
economy resembles a rent-seeking contest for a scarce set of rewards.
Now consider the gains from being an aspirational individual in this mod-
ied economy. This will depend on whether  is high enough to induce a
rat race. Hence18:
 () =
(
1
2
 
 Z
2
+ 

Z
 
Z   1 if   = Z
Z
h


 
1 + 
2
  i otherwise.
An immediate observation from this is 0 () < 0 whenever  > = Z so
having more aspirational individuals in the population reduces the return to
being aspirational since it increases the intensity of the rate race. This has
rather di¤erent implications for the dynamics of aspiration compared to the
core model of the previous section. Specically:
Proposition 8 If Z

 
1 + 
2

> 1 > 

 
1 + 
2

, then the economy converges
globally to an interior equilibrium where the fraction of aspirational individ-
uals ^ = 

 
1 + 
2
 2 (0; 1).
18To see this observe that the probability that a high aspirations individual achieves
high income is
e 
e
=


when  > = Z.
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Proof. As in the core model, the dynamics will be governed by t+1   t =
(1  )t (1  t) [2 ( (t))  1]. Under the condition in the Proposition,
 (0) > 0 >  (1) and there is a unique value of  at which  (^) = 0.
Moreover t+1  ^ = (1  ) ^ (1  ^) [2 ( (^))  1] = 0 with t+1 t > 0
for all t < ^ and t+1   t < 0 for all t > ^. Thus there is global
convergence to ^ for all  2 [0; 1].
The reasoning behind this is fairly straightforward. Under the stated
condition, there is gain to being aspirational when there is no rat race, e.g.
  = Z. However, eventually (for high enough ) the rat race begins and
being aspirational is less worthwhile. Eventually, the rat race is so intense
that individuals are worse o¤ being aspirational. The point at which the
gains to be an aspirational type are zero is then a stable point. It is easy
to see that the interior point is decreasing in  ; the loss aversion parameter
and increasing in , the potential fraction of high income jobs.
The possibility of a rat race also has consequences for the welfare eco-
nomics of aspirational societies since the welfare of the aspirational type is
positive as long as there is no scarcity of high income jobs. However, once
high income jobs become scarce, i.e.  > = Z, then creating more aspira-
tional types leads to an excessive aggregate e¤ort level as individuals strive to
capture these high-income positions while ignoring the negative externality
that they are imposing on others.
In summary, this section has emphasised that there is a somewhat funda-
mental di¤erence between two kinds of economies when assessing the role of
aspirations. If the opportunities for aspirational individuals are not intrin-
sically scarce, then encouraging aspiration has positive consequences. How-
ever, if such opportunities are rationed, this is less clear-cut. In practice,
there are elite positions in society such as access to certain universities and
jobs, which have not expanded materially over time and, for which the idea
of an aspirational rate race would seem relevant. It would, of course, be
possible to combine the analysis of an externality coming through a rat race
e¤ect together with the externality coming through endogenous redistribu-
tion. This would complicate things since the direction of the externality
would be unclear a priori. However, the possibility of aspirational individu-
als inducing a rat race would remain an important caveat to the analysis.
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6 Some Evidence fromTheWorld Values Sur-
vey
This section looks at data from the World Values Survey, a large scale data
set which has been collected since 1981 to explore values and beliefs of citizens
across the world. Specically, it measures a wide variety of attitudes and
beliefs with coverage of nearly 100 countries. The rst step will be to look at
measures of aspirations in the data which could be thought of as representing
one of the core ideas in the theoretical model, i.e. having an aspirational
attitude. We will then look at how this is correlated with other attitudes
which are also motivated by some of the core elements of the model using
only within-country variation. The section also reports on cross-country
patterns in the data using average responses to questions in country.
6.1 Measuring Aspiration
There is no straightforward way of bringing the stylized theory developed so
far to the data. However, there is a question in the World Values survey
which asks how far a respondent identies themselves as valuing being rich
and to value having a lot of money/expensive things. To map this to the
model, it could be interpreted this as a measure of the reference point, r, in
the theory. The specic question that will be used is:
"Using this card, would you please indicate for each descrip-
tion whether that person is very much like you, like you, some-
what like you, not like you, or not at all like you? It is important
to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive
things."
From this one can generate a dummy variable which is equal to one if the
respondent answers either "very much like me, like me, somewhat like me or
a little like me" and zero if the respondent answers "not like me and not at
all like me". A respondent is classied as being aspirational if this dummy
variable is equal to one. The question was asked in waves 5 and 6 of the
World Values Survey. Of the 156453 respondents who answered this question
in 77 di¤erent countries, an average of 58% are classied as aspirational using
this criterion. In terms of country-level averages, this varies between 22%
and 94% suggesting a fair bit of cross-country cultural variation. Being
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aspirational increased on average by 7% over the ve year period between
the survey waves.
As a robustness check, it is useful to look at another measure of being
aspirational based on individual answers to the question:
 Being very successful is important to this person; to have
people recognize ones achievements
with a similar scale as to the core question. On the basis of this question, a
respondent is classied as being aspirational if they answer "very much like
me, like me, somewhat like me or a little like me" and zero otherwise. This
is also asked in waves 5 and 6. Interestingly, this has quite a low correlation
with the rst measure (a correlation coe¢ cient of around 0.24).
6.2 Within-Country Variation
Core Variables Following the theory, whether a respondent is aspirational
as an independent characteristic reecting their underlying preferences. The
theory suggests that this should inuence their e¤ort put into earning income
and educational attainment. That said, there is a standard concern about
omitted variables we will check whether correlations between being aspira-
tional and other variables of interest are similar if we control for age, gender,
income and education. The Tables below therefore report correlations with
and without these controls being included. All of these controls are based
on questions asked in the World Values Survey. The survey attempts to
collect information on the respondents household income on an internation-
ally comparable basis across countries. However, this is quite di¢ cult to
do in a survey whose main focus is not on the economic situation of house-
holds. Moreover, data on income where there have been e¤orts to collect
it on a comparable basis and adjusting for international di¤erences in prices
is quite limited and would dramatically reduce the sample size. That said,
all specications will include country xed-e¤ects which will take account of
systematic country-specic factors. One income question which has been
asked frequently and hence does not limit the sample size too much is the
following:
"On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the
lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your
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country. We would like to know in what group your household
is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages,
salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in."
This is answered on a ten point scale and a respondent is classied according
to the answer that they give to this question. A potential concern with this
variable is that it reects a perception of how well o¤ someone is relative to
others. Individuals may also have limited knowledge of where they stand in
the income distribution and could even include willful misrepresentation.19
For education, there is a variable in the survey that gives a three way classi-
cation of educational attainment low, middle and high. Age di¤erences
are measured by placing respondents into one of three bins: 15 to 29, 30-49
and 50 and over. Self-reported gender is also used as a control.
Descriptive Statistics Table 1 gives the mean of the aspirations variable
by income group and education. There is tendency for aspirations to be
positively correlated with income which does make sense according the theo-
retical model. However, even among the lowest self-reported income group,
around 48% of respondents classied themselves as aspirational compared to
64% in the highest income group so the gradient is quite modest. Aspiration
actually seems to be highest in the middle education group. However, the
lack of any strong relationship with educational attainment is quite striking.
We also look at how aspiration varies by age and there is evidence of that
the proportion of aspirational types decreases with age. However, the data
do not permit us to distinguish this age-based from a cohort e¤ect. It is an
interesting question whether there are shifts over the life-cycle and a richer
model could allow for aspirations to be updated over the life cycle in response
to peer interactions and other inuences. Table 1 also shows that men are
more likely be classied as aspirational than women. This is also an inter-
esting feature to bring into a future model given the advances in womens
economic status in many countries but this would require a richer model of
socialization where boys and girls are treated di¤erently by their parents and
other societal inuences. However, this nding is also consistent with the
idea that there are fewer labor market opportunities for women compared to
men so that the gains from being aspirational are lower for women than men.
19This banded variable in the World Values Survey which is collected separately by
country strongly predicts the income band data in surveys where both are available.
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Table 1 here
Correlations This section reports correlation between aspirations and a
range of variables. The theory suggests that people who are aspirational
will tend to value work more (as a crude measure of e) and the World Values
Survey asks respondents how much they value work in their life. We code
this as a dummy variable called "Importance of Work" which is equal to one
if the respondent says that work is "very important or rather important" and
zero if they regard it as "not very important or not at all important". Across
the sample where we also have respondent information on aspirations, 89%
say that work is important.
Given the focus of the theory on intergenerational transmission, it is also
possible to look at whether respondents say that hard work is an important
value among their children based on a question which asks the respondent to
report whether they regard hard work to be a quality which it is important
for a child to learn at home. This is turned into a dummy variable which
is equal to one if this is mentioned as a quality that the respondent values
and it is labelled "Hard Work Important for Children". Across the sample
where we have information on aspirations, this mean of this dummy variable
is 58%.
Another crude way to get at the link to intergenerational socialization is
to look at whether individuals regard it as important to make their parents
proud. This is somewhat di¢ cult to map to the theoretical mechanism.
However, one could hypothesize that those respondents with non-aspirational
parents would not regard being aspirational as making their parents proud.
However, if the lack of aspiration is due to parental indi¤erence to the fate
of their children, there could be a positive correlation between wanting to
make your parents proud and having an aspiration to be rich. This is coded
as a dummy variable which is equal to one if the respondent says that one
of their main goals in life is to make their parents proud and the variable is
labelled as "Making Parents Proud".
Being aspirational can also be related to two ways of measuring political
preferences. The rst uses answers to the question which asks respondents
how, on a scale between 1 and 10, they rate the proposition that governments
taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor is an essential characteristic of
democracywhere 1 means not at all essentialand 10 essential. Below,
this variable is labelled "Pro-redistribution" and it has a mean score of 6.4
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in the full sample. The second way of looking at political preferences is on
a standard left-right political scale. This asks respondents to place their
views on a scale where 10 is right wing and 1 is left wing. This variable is
called "Right Wing Score" and has a mean of 5.7 across the sample (having
full support across the range of possible scores).
For outcome variable xict for respondent i in country c in wave t, the
Table below reports the result of regressions of the following kind:
xict = t + c + aict + zict + "ict
where ft; cg are wave and country dummies, aict is the aspirations dummy
variable and zict are gender, age, income and educational controls.
The results are reported in Table 2. In each case, the results are shown
with and without controls. The rst two columns look at correlations with
whether the respondent thinks work is important. Here, there is a positive
and strongly signicant correlation which becomes insignicanrt once con-
trols are included. In columns (3) and (4), the left hand side variable is
whether hard work is valued in children and there is a statistically signi-
cant correlation with our measure of being aspirational which is now more
strongly signicant once controls are included. When looking at a measure
of whether an individual views it as important to make their parents proud
(columns (5) and (6)), there is a highly consistent and signicant result with
and without controls. The remaining columns, (7) through (10), consider
policy preferences and politics. Table 2 shows that individuals that are
aspirational as measured here are less likely to say that redistribution is a
priority and more likely to self-identify as right wing.
Table 2 here
In Table 3, the results are reported for the second way of classifying an
individual as aspirational and are broadly similar although there does not
seem to be a signicant correlation with redistributive preferences in this
case.
Table 3 here
Summing Up This evidence is ay best suggestive. However, it does help
to breath some life into an otherwise highly stylized theoretical exercise.
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There appears to be a link between valuing hard work and desiring less re-
distribution among those who are aspirational and both of these correlations
are in line with what we would expect from the theory even though it is not
a direct test of any part of the mechanism. It is worth noting that these
correlations are generally robust the inclusion of controls for age, gender,
income and education.
6.3 Between-country Evidence
To look at how the average level of aspirations varies across countries, the
next Table will correlate the mean of the aspirations measure at a country
level with country characteristics. In contrast to the within-country evi-
dence, there is a robust negative correlation between the proportion of the
population in a country who are classied as being aspirational and the level
of income per capita in a country. One straightforward way of seeing this is
in Figure 2 which plots the mean of the answer to the aspirations question
against the log of income per capita in the Penn World Tables.
Figure 2 here
This nding may seem puzzling given that the theory emphasised a posi-
tive correlation between income and the proportion of aspirational individuals
in the population. However, the rat race model developed in section 5 above
where opportunities for aspirational individuals are limited can make sense
of this. To make this more precise, let c be the fraction of aspirational
individuals in country c. If c > = Z in the model of section 5 then the
covariance between average income and c across countries is:
cov
r

c
 Z [aH   aL] + aL; c

< 0. (6)
which is consistent with the cross-sectional pattern in Figure 2 if we make
the very strong assumption that the other parameters take on similar values
across countries.
While it might be tempting to conclude from this that the rat-race model
is a more plausible way of thinking about the issue, it would be premature
to rush such a conclusion given that all parameters of the model are likely
to vary cross-sectionally in arbitrary and complex ways. Even though the
model does give a steer for one factor that could have some relevance in
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cross-country income di¤erences, the fact that we have set aside all standard
explanations for cross-country income di¤erences is also a major caveat when
trying to use any simple model to interpret Figure 2.
Note also that, in a more general setting, it would be important to con-
sider the possibility that countries use other countriesincomes as a reference
point for dening their aspirations while the model developed above assumes
that this is determined from what constitutes high income in the country in
which an individual resides. Access to global media could mean that aspira-
tions become an internationally determined reference point, at least for some
citizens who have access to such information. How the use of technologies,
such as social media, which enables a more global perspective for compar-
isons a¤ects how attitudes evolve is an interesting area to which the ideas
developed here could be relevant. As noted above, the issue of aspirations
failure, following Ray (1988, 2006), is increasingly being thought of as source
of poverty.
7 Wider Issues and Future Research
This paper has taken a highly specic approach and deliberately taken a one-
dimensional view of a complex set of issues. The primary purpose has been
to explore how endogenous preferences (in the form of aspirations) can be
incorporated into our understanding of the dynamics of income distribution
within and between countries. The analysis leaves many open challenges
and suggests a number of directions for future research.
The approach to preference change studied here could be applied to many
di¤erent dimensions of preference. It provides a tractable framework for
thinking about preference socialization and how institutions and policies can
a¤ect this. The indirect evolutionary approach of Güth (1995) and Güth and
Yaari (1992) provides a nice balance of strategic and non-strategic behavior.
However, it could also be extended to allow for a more strategic approach to
socialization as studied, for example, in Bisin and Verdier (2001).
The paper has worked with standard preferences determining the level of
redistribution. However, it would be interesting to think about how prefer-
ences evolve when people care about social objectives which a¤ect redistrib-
ution. If there were more forward-looking behavior, then voters could also
care about the impact of their redistributive policy choices on how societies
preferences evolve. More generally, the literature in political economy has
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studied situations where preferences are xed and then derived implications
of institutions dened as rules of the gamefor the way in which economies
work. The approach taken here could see a potential role for a feedback
mechanism from institutions to preferences which a¤ect the sustainability of
a particular institutional arrangements.20
The model of intergenerational transmission of advantage developed here
is extremely simple and could be enriched in a variety of ways. One direc-
tion would be to bring back more traditional sources of economic advantage
and consider how these a¤ect the arguments. Moreover, direct parental
investments would give a further reason for an individuals socio-economic
background to matter. These, however, are complementary mechanisms
to those studied here. One of the trickier issues raised by the framework
presented here from a policy point of view is the idea that parents endow
children with preferences since this creates concerns about how policies aimed
at social engineering should be designed and how far they intrude upon fam-
ily life. Some forms of early childhood intervention outside the home is
clearly deemed acceptable in most societies when it is voluntary. However,
the threshold for removing children from their home environment completely
(even when apparently in their best interest) is much more di¢ cult. Re-
cent experiments on moving to opportunity of the kind study in Chetty and
Hendren (2015) also constitute an interesting form of social engineering.
While the focus has been on aspiration, the idea that there is a range
of behavior which the young may engage in with a poor appreciation of its
long-run consequences is much wider than this. Other examples where the
ideas in this paper would be relevant include criminality, abuse of drugs and
alcohol, and smoking. To the extent that this has irreversible consequences
and a strong cultural basis in family background, dynamic cultural forces
intertwined with policy choices will potentially be important.
Delving more deeply into the nature of socialization mechanisms is an
important issue for further work. We have focused here on parental inuence.
But cultural parents and peers are a much wider group. Integrating our
understanding of preference socialization with social network formation is an
important agenda item. While you cannot choose who your parents are,
these other forms of social inuence are dependent on choices raising a range
of interesting and di¢ cult modelling issues.
20Ticchi, Verdier and Vindigni (2014) and Besley and Persson (2016) look at the co-
evolution of values and institutions in a model of socialization of values.
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The approach developed does not appear as successful as a means of
looking at di¤erences in aggregate incomes across countries. This is perhaps
not too surprising given the myriad of complex factors which shape this.
However, there is scope for bringing the importance of preference change
into such debates. This links back to wider discussions in the economic
development literature about a potential role for cultural factors in a¤ecting
economic progress. This paper has provided a framework that could be
helpful in thinking about culture as an endogenously evolving factor which
responds to policies which are themselves determined by existing preferences.
The range of issues to which these ideas could, in principle, be applied is vast.
One limiting feature of the framework is that there are only two distinct
preference types in the population. In reality, there is likely to be a wider
range of types with transition possibilities across the range. How far relaxing
this would change any of the conclusions or insights generated here remains
to be seen.
There are also a range of policy challenges which the world faces that seem
unlikely to be met until preferences change. Chief among these is climate
change where current generations seem reluctant to pay a signicant price in
terms of the way that they live to support a more sustainable future. Trying
to make policy changes in the teeth of widespread opposition by citizens is
unlikely to be successful. Thus, the dynamics of preferences seem critical in
understanding how this is likely to play out. Another area where changes in
preferences and values are important concerns attitudes towards acceptable
forms of inequality, particularly what is deemed fair in the design of policies
and allocation of resources.
Finally, it is clear that there is much more scope for looking at data which
is relevant to the ideas in the model. One interesting line of research is to
look at how using data on migration of particular groups with measures of
attitudes and economic success. Migration may itself be a product of aspi-
rations which is then transmitted to the o¤spring of migrants. Bringing this
together with longitudinal data sets which track people over time may also
yield insights into whether sources of aspirational preferences are indicative
of parental inuence or other peer groups.
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8 Concluding Comments
This paper has suggested a framework for analyzing socialization of aspira-
tional preferences with implications for the evolution of an economy. This
framework has a feedback mechanism based on the dynamics of redistrib-
ution as the aggregate attitudes of a population evolve. It predicts that
aspirational societies will have higher income and less redistribution. How-
ever, lower income individuals may still gain from being in an aspirational
society to the extent that they benet from redistribution when the size of
the pie is larger. The model is able to articulate the logic of an aggregate
aspirations trap in which low levels of aspiration lead to low payo¤s for
aspirational types which then fosters a decline in aspirations over time.
The dominant tradition in economics fosters a reluctance to make pref-
erences endogenous. A major concern is that once this degree of freedom is
allowed then anything can trivially follow. However, this paper has incorpo-
rated endogenous preferences in a highly structured way. The key element
of the model which drives the results is the feedback from the payo¤s that
di¤erent types have in the societal equilibrium to preference evolution. This
is a form of societal adaptation which could have implications in a wide range
of economic settings. In broad terms it suggests a reason why preferences
will tend to conform to the kind of society that evolves. But that same
process can also lead to self-reinforcing decline as well as progress.
Aspirations traps can occur at either an individual level by patterns of
partnering or at a societal level where policies grow to reect majority views.
Just what kind of policy intervention is warranted in many situations is
not straightforward. There may be little political support for policies that
try to lean against the values that are nurtured in family settings even if
these are an important source of advantage and disadvantage. Parents quite
naturally want the best for their own children which they will tend to see
through their own eyes. However, this can lead to entrenched disadvantage.
Likewise, feedback e¤ects into policy and politics may work either to the
detriment or benet of any given society. Democratic decision making is no
guarantee of success in the kind of model suggested here raising the di¢ cult
question of how far external political action is justied from the outside
looking in. Respect for the sovereignty of family values and democratic
political sovereignty of a nation does not provide a cast-iron guarantee of
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long-run success once preferences are endogenous.
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Table1:  Aspirations, Income and Education 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
Income Group 1 0.48 0.50 12203 
Income Group 2 0.50 0.50 12374 
Income Group 3 0.54 0.50 18084 
Income Group 4 0.57 0.50 20408 
Income Group 5 0.58 0.49 30032 
Income Group 6 0.63 0.48 21365 
Income Group 7 0.66 0.48 16916 
Income Group 8 0.68 0.47 10006 
Income Group 9 0.66 0.47 3485 
Income Group 10 0.64 0.47 3052 
Education: Low 0.56 0.50 40716 
Education: Middle 0.59 0.50 67457 
Education: High 0.57 0.50 37067 
Age: 15-29 0.68 0.47 45234 
Age  30-49 0.60 0.49 61298 
Age: 50+ 0.46 0.50 49569 
Male 0.61 0.49 74903 
Female 0.55 0.50 81403 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Aspirations and Other Attitudes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variable Importance 
of Work 
Importance 
of Work 
Hard 
Work 
Important 
for 
Children 
Hard 
Work 
Important 
for 
Children 
 
Making 
Parents 
Proud 
Making 
Parents 
Proud 
Pro-
redistribution 
Pro-
redistribution 
Right 
Wing 
Score 
Right 
Wing 
Score 
Aspirational 0.017***  
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.013*   
(0.007) 
0.021***    
(0.006) 
0.021***   
(0.004) 
0.021***   
(0.004) 
-0.119***   
(0.039) 
-0.077**   
(0.036) 
0.148***   
(0.037) 
0.142***    
(0.035) 
 
Controls 
 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 154148 135973 156449 137728 151665 134033 150009 133324 115429 104324 
           
R2 0.0402 0.0428 0.1811 0.1906 0.1280 0.1332 0.1005 0.1017 0.0907 0.1005 
 
Notes:  Sample covers 78 countries for 2007 and 2012.  All specifications include country and wave dummies.  Controls are ten dummies for income group, 
three for education group, gender and three age bands.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level.  A “*” denotes significant at 10%, a 
“**” significant at 5% and “***” significant at 1%. 
Table 3: Aspirations and Other Attitudes (Success Measure) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variable Importance 
of Work 
Importance 
of Work 
Hard 
Work 
Important 
for 
Children 
Hard 
Work 
Important 
for 
Children 
 
Making 
Parents 
Proud 
Making 
Parents 
Proud 
Pro-
redistribution 
Pro-
redistribution 
Right 
Wing 
Score 
Right 
Wing 
Score 
Aspirational 0.065***  
(0.007) 
0.051*** 
(0.006) 
0.011   
(0.007) 
0.019***    
(0.006) 
0.088***   
(0.007) 
0.090***   
(0.007) 
-0.003   
(0.044) 
-0.053   
(0.043) 
0.080**   
(0.037) 
0.102***    
(0.035) 
 
Controls 
 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 153575 135449 155811 137176 151199 133567 149538 132870 115154 104053 
           
R2 0.0455 0.0669 0.1818 0.1937 0.1359 0.1430 0.0910 0.1017 0.0818 0.0910 
 
Notes:  Sample covers 78 countries for 2007 and 2012.  All specifications include country and wave dummies.  Controls are ten dummies for income group, 
three for education group, gender and three age bands.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level.  A “*” denotes significant at 10%, a 
“**” significant at 5% and “***” significant at 1%.  Question for being aspirational is whether it is important to this person to be successful.  
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